Should the state support the \'right to die\'? by Egan, A
Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (hereafter E/PAS) is a 
practice with a long history. It was a frequent occurrence in the 
Ancient World, despite the prohibitions of the Hippocratic Oath 
(which had no legal standing and was supported by a minority of 
Greco-Roman physicians). It was condemned as murder by the 
Christian community and prohibited in Christian Europe (though 
– like abortion – was no doubt practised secretly). Strong support 
and advocacy for E/PAS re-emerged in the 19th century in Europe 
and North America. The first attempts to legalise it, in a number of 
states in the USA, were defeated in the early 1900s, though vol-
untary euthanasia societies advocating for reform of existing laws 
proliferated there and throughout Europe.1 Although not legal, cas-
es brought before the courts – particularly in the USA, Britain and 
The Netherlands – were treated with remarkable leniency.
Today, E/PAS has been legalised in a few countries and is 
treated with leniency or even a ‘blind eye’ in many others. It is the 
subject of fierce legal and moral debate.2 Religions are divided 
over whether it can ever be justified. Secular physicians, politi-
cians and ethicists are also engaged in the conflict on both sides. 
While support for E/PAS is strongest in the north, with surveys 
showing support ranging from 57% (USA) to 92% (The Nether-
lands), talk of introducing E/PAS legislation in South Africa shows 
that it has become a global issue. With the ever-present financial 
and logistical pressures on the public health service, particularly 
in developing countries like South Africa, E/PAS takes on a new 
dimension that gives the question added urgency.
In this paper we ask whether states should support ‘right to die’ 
practices. In particular we examine: 
•    whether E/PAS should be legalised in certain circumstances; 
and
•    whether physicians in the public health service should be re-
quired to practise E/PAS if it is legalised.      
Definition of terms
Before we debate E/PAS it is necessary to clarify our terms, partic-
ularly to distinguish active and passive, direct and indirect, volun-
tary and non-voluntary euthanasia, as well as physician-assisted 
suicide.
•    Euthanasia, from the Greek meaning ‘happy death’, is ‘one per-
son’s deliberate killing of another, not because they are threat-
ening injury or have committed a crime, but because their lives 
are reckoned not to be worth living.’3 It is usually associated 
in medical situations with patients with terminal illness and no 
hope of recovery, where the patient experiences great suffering, 
sometimes accompanied by physical pain that can no longer be 
properly treated with palliative care. 
•    Voluntary euthanasia occurs at the request, or by consent, of 
the person/ patient in this situation.
•    Non-voluntary euthanasia occurs without the request or consent 
of the person, where another person – often the physician or 
relative – considers that it would be the person’s wish for their 
life to be ended.
•    Involuntary euthanasia occurs against the person’s wishes, 
sometimes out of another’s belief that such a step is economi-
cally efficient or socially ‘hygienic’. It is widely rejected, even by 
defenders of E/PAS, as murder and is historically associated 
with the ‘euthanasia’ atrocities of the Nazi regime in Germany 
(1933 - 1945).
•    Assisted suicide occurs when a person helps another to kill him 
or herself, whether by providing information or means. If the 
helper is a doctor it is called physician-assisted suicide.
•   Active euthanasia is euthanasia by commission.3
•    Passive euthanasia is euthanasia by omission. Whether this is 
the same as ‘letting die’4 is disputed. Biggar3 says that by with-
holding treatment we might be practising passive euthanasia; 
conversely ‘[w]e might instead be recognising the futility of fur-
ther treatment and allowing the dying person to turn their limited 
reserves of energy from striving to stay alive to living as well as 
possible in the time that remains.’   
It might be useful at this stage to try to conflate our under-
standings of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. 
Ethicist Willem Landman5 has formulated a definition that seeks 
to include physician-assisted suicide into a definition of voluntary 
euthanasia: ‘The intentional bringing about of an individual’s death 
for that individual’s sake, where a positive act of a person other 
than that individual, and not merely withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment, is either a contributory cause or a proxi-
mate cause of death.’ 
States that support euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide
Few countries in the world have legalised E/PAS. As we mentioned 
above, it is widely regarded as a form of murder and remains a 
criminal offence. It is legal, however, in Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Colombia and the state of Oregon in the USA, and was briefly le-
galised in the Northern Territory of Australia. Its legal status is not 
clear in other places, notably Japan where in 1995 a Yokohama 
District Court ruled that ‘mercy killing’ could be justified if all medi-
cal conditions coincided with the expressed desire of a patient to 
shorten his or her life.
In The Netherlands, various forms of E/PAS were widely prac-
tised by the late 1990s although it was technically still illegal, de-
spite over 90% of the Dutch public supporting E/PAS. The Ter-
mination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act (2001) that 
went into force on 1 April 2002 was ‘generally considered as the 
codification of the norms and procedures that [had] governed the 
practice of euthanasia in The Netherlands for almost three dec-
ades’.6 Under this law ‘euthanasia’ and ‘physician-assisted suicide’ 
Should the state support the ‘right to die’?
Anthony Egan, SJ, PhD
The Jesuit Institute – South Africa, Victory Park, Johannesburg 
47         December 2008, Vol. 1, No. 2  SAJBL
    Article
were treated more or less the same. E/PAS was available to any 
terminally ill adult person (broadly defined) experiencing unbear-
able suffering with no hope of improvement who voluntarily and 
repeatedly requested an ending of his/her life. Advance directives 
were also taken into account. The physician involved in the proc-
ess had to be known to the patient for some time, had to agree 
that the patient’s situation was hopeless, and had to consult with 
another doctor, relatives and the caring team of the patient. A full 
written record of the case and a report to the authorities also had 
to be made. In effect the intention was to prevent rushed, unin-
formed or secretive end-of-life decisions.    
The Northern Territory of Australia presents an interesting case 
study. In 1995 the state legislature legalised active euthanasia un-
der certain restricted conditions: terminal illness, intractable pain 
and suffering, and repeated and expressed desire of an adult pa-
tient for euthanasia. Two persons availed themselves of the leg-
islation before the Australian Senate overruled and disallowed the 
legislation by a narrow majority (38 votes to 33) in March 1997. 
This was despite the fact that a vast majority of Australians sur-
veyed (roughly 81%) supported voluntary E/PAS.
In South Africa a 1997 discussion paper of the South African 
Law Commission introduced a Draft Bill on the Rights of the Ter-
minally Ill that included a number of provisions that would have 
legalised aspects of E/PAS. However reactions from the public 
were generally negative. Despite finding in a members’ survey that 
12% of physicians had already helped terminal patients to die, 9% 
had performed physician-assisted suicide, and 60% had practised 
passive euthanasia by withholding medication or procedures, the 
South African Medical Association in 1999 requested that pro-
posed legislation be put on hold. Numerous groups – Doctors for 
Life, Christians for Life and the National Alliance for Life – lobbied 
vigorously against reform in the law. To date, no E/PAS legislation 
has been passed in South Africa. Yet it remains an issue in the 
background and a source of contention.
What makes the South African case particularly complex are 
conflicting themes in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution and a 
series of significant legal cases regarding assisted suicide and the 
withholding of medical treatment. Under South African law suicide 
and attempted suicide are legal7,8 but euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide are not. Fundamental to the debate is whether a suicide was 
the direct result of assistance, or whether it constituted a novus 
actus, a new act. A number of conflicting legal judgments9-11 were 
resolved in an Appellate Court decision (Ex Parte Min. of Justice: 
S v. Grotjohn, 1970 2SA 355 (A))12 which held that directly as-
sisting or inciting someone to commit suicide was indeed a crime 
– though circumstances may find it to be murder, attempted mur-
der or culpable homicide. Subsequent cases have confirmed this 
ruling, though some scholars8 have argued for more lenient treat-
ment of such cases according to circumstances.
A further tension in the law has subsequently arisen in terms 
of conflicting human rights claims in the Bill of Rights of the new 
Constitution. The Bill of Rights emphasises personal liberty, the 
right to life and the right to emergency medical treatment. In 1997 
the Soobramoney case13 came before the Constitutional Court. A 
terminally ill chronic renal patient was refused dialysis by a state 
hospital, which led ultimately to his death. The plaintiffs for Soo-
bramoney argued that he had a constitutional right to life and to 
emergency medical treatment. Recognising that the treatment 
was futile and represented an unjustifiable burden on limited state 
medical resources the Court ruled in favour of the hospital service. 
This clarified the sense in which the emergency care clause of the 
Bill of Rights was interpreted: the right to emergency care was not 
absolute but conditional on there being a reasonable hope that a 
patient might recover. It mirrored the common medical practice of 
triage in hospital emergency rooms. Doctors were not obligated 
to use what they considered to be extraordinary means to keep 
patients alive in what they professionally judged to be hopeless 
situations.
In the medical profession the Bill of Rights has also led to a 
much stronger defence of patient autonomy. ‘Medical paternal-
ism’, a global source of concern for decades, has been success-
fully challenged by the growing movement for human rights for 
patients. Where patients are able to do so, they have the right 
to decide for themselves whether to undergo or refuse treatment. 
Increasingly, too, where they are physically unable to make such 
decisions for themselves, other persons who know them are able 
to stand in for them and make proxy decisions. Although as yet 
they have no legal standing, ‘living wills’ are also used as a source 
of direction for doctors as to their desire for certain forms of medi-
cal treatment.             
Arguments presented for and 
against E/PAS14,15
For ‘assisted’ death  
Two major arguments are frequently advanced.
Argument from respect for autonomy
This is based on the fundamental principle that patients as human 
beings have certain rights to decide for themselves what is good 
for them. (This is the first of the four basic principles of contempo-
rary medical ethics. The others are: beneficence (the obligation 
to act for the benefit of others), non-maleficence (the obligation 
not to harm) and justice (most difficult to define, but broadly the 
obligation to treat the person/patient fairly within the norms of the 
given society)). It is an argument based on human freedom and 
choice, one that is fundamental to biomedical ethics, but which is 
also problematic since ‘little agreement exists about its nature and 
strength or about specific rights’16 (my italics) that it entails. Simply 
put, it would argue that, since physicians should (within reason) 
respect the wishes of morally autonomous (i.e. adult) patients, the 
request for E/PAS should be honoured if their condition is hope-
less and they experience great suffering, including pain that can-
not reasonably be alleviated. 
Argument from mercy
No one, it is argued, ought to be compelled to endure extreme suf-
fering if terminally ill and if pain cannot be relieved by other means. 
E/PAS is the acceptable, indeed merciful, alternative. 
Against ‘assisted’ death
Here we might consider three arguments.
Killing is intrinsically wrong
The basic commandment in all religions and ethical systems is 
‘Thou shalt not kill.’ Even given that this Judeo-Christian formu-
lation of the commandment is commonly taken to mean ‘Do not 
murder’, the fundamental assumption is that it is always wrong to 
directly kill the innocent. Therefore E/PAS, particularly in its active 
and direct forms, is intrinsically wrong.
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The danger of a ‘slippery slope’
Another argument against E/PAS is that by allowing it we will be on 
a slippery slope from voluntary euthanasia through non-voluntary 
forms to allowing involuntary euthanasia of a kind akin to the Nazi 
programme in the 1930s to purge Germany of ‘defectives’. If it is 
allowed, it is argued, doctors will feel able to do what they like and 
– acting out of laziness, indifference to patients, the pressures of 
medical expenditures (particularly in state health care) or out of 
greed for more lucrative procedures than terminal care – take de-
cisions for themselves.
The physician’s role argument
A third argument is that E/PAS explicitly violates the principle of 
doing no harm enshrined in the Hippocratic Oath, the medical eth-
ics of Moses Maimonides, and subsequent developments (e.g. the 
1948 Geneva Declaration). Following on from that, it is argued that 
E/PAS would violate patient-physician trust and undermine the es-
sentially curative role of the physician.17 
Moral tensions: autonomy, suffering 
and conscience 
To tease out this problem further we need to consider what might 
be three conflicting moral paradigms or principles.
Autonomy
The principle of autonomy, mentioned above, is a central theme in 
contemporary biomedical ethics. Given the often shocking history 
of treatment of patients by some medical professionals – subtle 
and less subtle coercion into sometimes expensive and/or dan-
gerous treatments (in the doctors’ interests of medical research 
or personal gain), treating patients without sufficient explanation 
or simply a patronising ‘doctor knows best’ attitude – the principle 
that a patient has considerable, if not final, say in his/her treatment 
is not to be taken lightly. This is particularly pertinent in a country 
like South Africa where for decades public health care was for the 
majority of our citizens characterised by powerlessness: power-
lessness, often, in seeking the best available treatment; power-
lessness in having often to make do with inadequate treatment 
and inferior equipment provided by doctors, some of whom were 
apartheid ‘bureaucrats in white coats’ with little knowledge of or 
sensitivity to the medical needs of their patients or to the complexi-
ties of African culture.
Autonomy is also important socially to a liberal democratic so-
ciety based on individual liberties as enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 
In a liberal democracy the liberty of the individual to make one’s 
own decisions without coercion (subject of course to the law) is 
crucial. This too, in South Africa’s case is particularly significant 
given the scandalous degree to which the disenfranchised major-
ity were subjected to a swathe of petty and gross restrictions on 
their lives – where they could live, work and study; what they were 
allowed to say or read; even who they could marry. 
But, unless one is an extreme libertarian, autonomy is not un-
limited. People are constrained in their freedom by circumstances, 
abilities, family, customs, culture and the laws that (should at least) 
fairly govern behaviour so that no person’s rights and liberties are 
infringed or destroyed by another (including an over-reaching 
state). 
Can we then use autonomy as a justification for legalising 
E/PAS? Can we really claim that one has an absolute right over 
one’s own body? Religious communities reject such a claim, 
claiming that our absolute right to ourselves is overridden by God. 
Life is a gift of God given to human beings under a condition of 
stewardship. We do not own our lives but live them for God, who 
ultimately has the decision about when life shall end. The funda-
mental principle of not killing an innocent person extends to a re-
jection of suicide and by further extension to E/PAS.3,18-20 Many 
religious traditions accept the principle that preserving life is not 
an absolute duty – indeed, that it may be legitimate to withhold 
futile treatment, not use extraordinary means to keep people alive, 
or indeed to administer potentially lethal doses of painkiller even 
if possible death is foreseen though not intended. Few however 
accept in principle E/PAS.
Such an objection is viable, in a secular and religiously plural-
ist society, only for those who share these beliefs. A secular state 
which has to act in the interests of all citizens of all religions and 
none cannot use this as an argument against legalising E/PAS, 
however much they wish to respect citizens’ religious beliefs. Nor 
do all believers, moreover, share the convictions of their religious 
tradition; some are ignorant, others dissent.
More convincing is the sociological and psychological fact that 
people are in fact not as autonomous as they might imagine. Hu-
man beings are a product of, and are shaped to varying degrees 
by, their society and culture. Seemingly autonomous, the human 
being is constantly being pressurised by a range of sometimes 
conflicting messages in the environment. It is conceivable, then, 
that a person may seek E/PAS for motives less than the con-
ventional reason (longstanding and incurable pain and suffering 
caused by a terminal illness). They may feel (directly or indirectly) 
pressurised into seeking an end to life by feelings of being a physi-
cal, mental or financial burden to family and friends. Sickness may 
simply be a pretext.
Does this exclude autonomy as a justification for legalising E/
PAS? Religious claims aside, it does not. What it emphasises is 
the need for profound caution if E/PAS is legalised. It clearly ex-
cludes medical professionals from arbitrarily ending patients’ lives 
that they may consider futile. Similarly it excludes any simplistic 
‘E/PAS on demand’ approach to ending life: given the deep-seated 
concern for respect for life that marks the principles of medicine 
and social life. Patient autonomy in this case is seen for what it is 
– limited. 
Under a system that legalises E/PAS, while patient autono-
my to seek E/PAS may be guaranteed it can never be the sole 
grounds for receiving it. One does not simply get what one wants 
when it is something so final that has such a personal and social 
impact. There need to be serious grounds for justification. As we 
have noted above, the strongest reason for seeking E/PAS is suf-
fering.               
Suffering
The fundamental reason advanced for seeking – and for legalis-
ing – E/PAS is unbearable pain and suffering. Few if any seek 
‘death on demand’. Among advocates of E/PAS unbearable pain 
and suffering is understood as a situation where existing medical 
treatments for terminal illnesses are futile, where pain control may 
not be sufficiently effective, or where the illness leads to a slow, 
debilitating death. Suffering is understood as more than physical 
pain but also severe mental anguish – as distinguished from de-
pression – leading to a sense that one’s quality of life is so dimin-
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ished as to be non-existent or virtually non-existent. Such suffering 
that destroys one’s quality of life – sometimes understood as one’s 
biographical life – is seen as grounds for a person to seek E/PAS.
This raises a number of controversies, many of them rooted 
in religious traditions but with direct relevance to secular people. 
Should suffering be allowed? Should we not try to fight suffering 
– and if so, to what lengths should one go?
Many religious traditions hold, in varying ways, that suffering 
is the will of God. This can have two meanings: that God wills suf-
fering or that God allows it. If one claims that suffering is the will 
of God the implication is that God may demand it, possibly for sin. 
Such a claim, even for a believer, is problematic: at best, if suffer-
ing is a punishment for sin, God is a punishing God; at worst, if 
God simply demands it God is a sadist.21 The latter image seems 
incoherent and unbelievable, given most religions have firm belief 
in a loving God. The former image raises a range of theological 
issues that cannot adequately be addressed here and moreover 
does not address the age-old question of why bad things happen 
to good people.
More often religions may claim that God allows suffering. Suf-
fering is a part of human life, often the consequence of free human 
actions or, in the case of illness, combinations of bad luck, neg-
ligence or unfortunate genetic defects. God allows suffering and 
human beings are faced with how they deal with it. In the Christian 
tradition there is the classic example of the suffering of Jesus of 
Nazareth whose course of action led to his death – and the exam-
ples of countless Christian martyrs who died for the faith. This is 
true too for many secular martyrs and leaders who have suffered 
for their convictions.
 A frequent religious claim is that suffering is best avoided, if it 
can be, but if it cannot, it should be endured. Suffering too, many 
religions claim, can also be an opportunity for a deepening faith in 
a compassionate God – and the dying process, if it leads to death, 
can be an opportunity for strengthening relationships with others, 
and for reconciliation of differences between people. True, too, for 
secular people who come together around a dying family member 
or friend.
This is not the whole picture, however. A slow death accompa-
nied by great suffering can also be a time of trauma for everyone 
– whether they are believers or not. Time and again, physicians, 
therapists and clergy are confronted with people, the dying and 
assorted relatives and friends alike, emotionally shattered by ex-
periencing such a terrible end to a life. Religious faith, too, may be 
shattered rather than deepened.
As to those who suffer and/or die for a noble cause, this much 
might be said: whether consciously or as a result of their actions, 
they embraced the possibility or reality of their suffering. They may 
have found it redemptive or for a greater good, but to varying de-
grees it was chosen, not imposed upon them. 
Moreover the value of suffering is not the only dimension to 
great religious traditions. In most religions suffering, particularly 
the unjust suffering of the innocent, is a moral challenge to end or 
reduce suffering. All great religions precisely because they value 
the human being so highly have developed moral teachings that 
defend human life, dignity, social and economic justice. Religions 
act, often heroically, on behalf of those who suffer, demonstrating 
great compassion for them. Mercy is a theme of all great faiths. 
Indeed these values are common to secular people and organisa-
tions too. The question is: to what degree should mercy cause 
them to rethink E/PAS? Similarly, if God is not a sadist and allows 
rather than demands suffering, should this same God – who is 
universally understood as loving and compassionate by the great 
faiths – not also allow means to alleviate excessive suffering, even 
to the point of E/PAS?
Believers or not, suffering offers us a strong challenge. In itself, 
the value of suffering does not offer us a clear argument against 
E/PAS. If anything it offers a stronger case for legalising E/PAS, 
though this does in itself raise a further problem.
If, for argument’s sake, E/PAS was legalised in South Africa, 
what criteria would be used – apart from respecting the autono-
mous will of a patient – to proceed? In The Netherlands since 2002 
a strict process has been in place. The patient requests euthana-
sia from his/her doctor, who must be known to them for at least a 
few years. The doctor examines the case carefully, in particular 
to be certain that the patient’s suffering is indeed unbearable and 
not motivated by depression or social factors. If there seem to be 
grounds, the doctor consults another physician who must concur. 
Relatives must be informed of the patient’s decision before E/PAS 
proceeds. The whole case must be carefully documented and re-
ported to the Ministry of Health. Failure to conform to any part of 
the process results in the prosecution of the doctor.
Whether this method or a variation (like leaving the decision to 
an ethics committee, cf. Landman)5 were to be adopted in South 
Africa, and although it reflects both patient autonomy and the key 
factor of suffering, a further key factor – conscience – would still 
have to be addressed. 
Conscience
E/PAS, however rational the reason, entails a terrible choice – par-
ticipating in the direct ending of a human life. Even if it were le-
gal, E/PAS entails for almost any normal person a terrible moral 
dilemma, a problem of conscience. This is particularly acute for 
those actively involved in administering E/PAS, the medical pro-
fessionals.
To follow one’s conscience – one’s formed and informed con-
science – is the core of moral activity. Ethicist Martin Prozesky22 
defines conscience as ‘the inner voice of ethics, of right and wrong, 
of good and evil. We can think of it as our built-in guidance system 
in the search for the good life. It is the uncomfortable feeling we get, 
or should get, when we lie, speak cruelly, cheat on somebody  … or 
do any of the many things we know are wrong. It is also the warm 
and noble feeling that comes when we do the right thing   … espe-
cially when it costs us something to do these things.’
Conscience is ‘the whole person’s commitment to value and 
the judgment one makes in light of who one ought to be and what 
one ought to do and not do.’23 It can be understood psychologically 
as ‘decisions or judgments based on an internal sense of ought-
ness (how I should live and what I must do) that is the result of a 
life history that incorporates who I am, who I am becoming, and 
who I desire to be.’24 Conscience is both the inwardly directed and 
ongoing search for my deepest, most authentic self – a self which 
includes a fundamental moral option, towards good or evil – and 
outwardly directed towards making the right decisions; in short, 
doing the good thing.
Since such decisions, if one is to be an authentic person, must 
ultimately come from within – from a realist moral perspective – fol-
lowing one’s conscience must take note of what a sense of moral-
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ity requires. One does not have to deny that an objective moral 
order exists, but one has to see how we appropriate for ourselves 
the values, principles or paradigms that constitute the moral order. 
Indeed, Josef Fuchs25  – one of the greatest 20th century Catholic 
ethicists – insists that it is ‘not possible to learn about objective and 
morally correct behaviour and conduct in the world from external 
norms only but also from one’s own convictions embedded in the 
conscience.’
Some doctors support E/PAS; some allow exceptions to a gen-
eral opposition to it; others are strongly pro-life and cannot in good 
conscience countenance it. This is an important point because 
ultimately it’s the doctor who will directly or indirect perform PAS 
– and they must live with themselves afterwards. Doctors have 
rights as well as a range of beliefs – and in this debate they need 
to be heard, respected and as far as possible protected. If PAS 
and euthanasia are to be legalised in South Africa, what space 
should doctors have to conscientiously object to performing PAS? 
We have seen with the abortion bills how, though doctors in the-
ory have a ‘right to conscience’, these rights are frequently rid-
den roughshod over through a combination of pressures on young 
doctors (interns and community service doctors) and physicians 
in public health care – bullying administrators and senior physi-
cians, threat of no career advancement and sometimes the short-
age of available practitioners in a hospital – to act against their 
consciences. In traditional moral theology, in no less an orthodox 
theologian as Thomas Aquinas, an informed conscience trumps all 
rules. In a South Africa with pro-PAS, pro-euthanasia legislation, 
can pro-life doctors be guaranteed not to be slaves to law?
Legalisation?
Short of an appeal to the sanctity of life as a ‘gift’, are there any 
strong grounds for not legalising E/PAS? Probably not. But will 
legal clarification change the problem? Does law make a moral 
dilemma right? 
I don’t think so. At best a law makes some things permissible, 
other things culpable. To take a few examples:
1.    Apartheid law made marriage and/or sex across the ‘colour 
line’ illegal, restricted the majority of South Africans’ freedom of 
movement – and even citizenship – while giving security forces 
immense powers to violate generally accepted notions of civil 
and political liberty in the name of ‘national security’. South 
Africa in fact functioned for the most part as a rechtstaat with 
democratic elections, parliament and an independent judiciary. 
Yet – it was a fundamentally immoral system, so immoral that 
it had to be overthrown.
2.    Conscription of adult, white males was compulsory under the 
old order – yet many young South Africans chose to conscien-
tiously object to service in the South African Defence Force, 
whether for universal religious or secular pacifist or political 
reasons. To those who fought against apartheid – including 
those now in government – they were heroes because they did 
not put their beliefs ‘on hold’.  
3.    Under our new democracy the abortion laws were consider-
ably liberalised, while the death penalty was abolished – but 
repeated surveys suggest that the majority of South Africans 
believe that the abortion laws should be repealed while capital 
punishment should be reinstated. While I don’t want to debate 
the merits of my fellow citizens’ views on these issues, let me 
point out that here we find a situation where law-making does 
not resolve any moral issues, but is merely an expression of 
public policy.
In short, at best the law does not make morality – it makes laws 
or policies. Even if the state legalises euthanasia on demand, leg-
islation cannot replace each one of us making a moral decision as 
to the rightness or wrongness of what we do. In the proposed bill 
that was shelved, apart from a directive as to who might perform 
euthanasia or assisted suicide, there was, as exists in abortion 
situations, a clear ‘conscience clause’ – no doctor could be forced 
to perform PAS/euthanasia. 
And here lies a problem. The Ethics Institute of South Africa26 
found in 2001 in an admittedly small pilot survey that a majority 
of doctors were opposed to euthanasia (51%) and PAS (52%), 
although an overwhelming majority (73%) were sympathetic to the 
legalisation of patients’ advance directives clarifying the degree to 
which doctors were asked to preserve lives. Forty-three per cent 
were sympathetic to legalisation of provision of lethal drugs to pa-
tients seeking PAS (39% opposed, 18% neutral), while 44% were 
sympathetic to voluntary euthanasia (47% against, 9% neutral). 
These somewhat confused and confusing results suggest that 
even if E/PAS were legalised, medical practitioners would be di-
vided as to the morality of the law.
Medical practitioners will have to make up their minds wheth-
er they are prepared to participate in E/PAS. Of course following 
one’s conscience sometimes comes with a price. People of con-
science have suffered ridicule, ostracism, intimidation, imprison-
ment, torture and death for their convictions. We may think of the 
Hebrew prophets, of Jesus, of Muhammad, of the early Christians, 
of medieval scientists and doctors persecuted for ‘witchcraft’, of 
the socialist movement, of Soviet dissidents and those who re-
sisted fascism in its many forms. We may think of Gandhi, Martin 
Luther King, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and – closer to home – of Steve 
Biko, Bram Fischer and Nelson Mandela. All of them can echo the 
words of Martin Luther: ‘Here I stand. I can do none other.’
Individual conscience is not narcissism, nor is it bourgeois ide-
ology. We are social beings, interacting in many and various ways 
with each other, with our ancestors, with future generations. We 
have obligations to each, to society and to history – but also to 
ourselves. What we are is a product of certain social classes, ide-
ologies, religions, privileges (or lack of them). But if we are to stop 
thinking of ourselves as victims of history and rather as agents of 
history, people making history in relationship with others, we have 
to think of ourselves as persons making history by bringing our-
selves into the historical process. All these forces and persons are 
poured into our carbon-based life forms and give each one of us a 
particularity – personhood, personality, soul. Developing and living 
according to conscience is what makes us human. But it never 
makes decisions easy.
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